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CL TIAPPELLANT'S REPLY 
In it's Opposition to ClaimantlAppellant's Opening Brief, DefendantlRespondent 
Frontier Moving & StorageIState Insurance Fund (Trontier") argues that the 
Commission's findings were based on "substantial and competent evidence," and 
therefore Claimant's appeal must be denied. [Frontier's Opposition Brief, p. 91 Frontier 
further argues that the argument involving the "emergency doctrine" is a "new issue" 
Claimant should not be able to raise on appeal, and there was no "emergency" even if the 
emergency doctrine is considered. 
DefendantRespondent Roche Moving & Storagekiberty Northwest Insurance 
Corporation ("Roche"), in it's Opposition Brief, argues in essence that Claimant is 
inappropriately asking the Court to "reweigh and reapply the evidence" [Roche's 
Opposition Brief, p. 121 Further, Roche argues that Claimant was properly deemed a 
"volunteer" by the Referee when this accident occurred. Roche also makes essentially 
the same arguments regarding emergency as did Frontier. 
Both Frontier and Roche argue they are entitled to attorney's fees in addition to 
costs on appeal. 
REPLY mGUNLlENT: 
The issue at the hearing held on May 3 and 4,2007, was clearly defined as 
follows: "Who was claimant's employer or was claimant an independent contractor on 
August 9,2007?'Tr. p. 7, L. 9 -10, 
Neither Frontier nor Roche disputes that the above states the issue at the hearing 
of this matter. No objections were made at the hearing when the above issue was stated. 
The material facts in this accident are not in dispute. Whether Claimant had to 
climb over a forklift or not to get to the ladder is not material. [Frontier's Opposition, p. 
231 One important material fact not in dispute is that Claimant was an independent 
contractor when this accident happened. It is furfher not disputed that a "lumper" and 
"day laborer" are both considered employees. 
The issue was intentionally framed as above stated because who Claimant's 
employer was at the time of this accident was a significant question. Roche had recently 
been taken over by Frontier, but the sale had not been entirely completed at the time of 
this accident. Even though Claimant was clearly somebo4 S employee, it was not clear 
who that was when he was injured. 
Claimant contends that the Commission made an error of application of the law to 
the clear facts of this case and the Industrial Commission's legal conclusions are freely 
reviewable by this Court. Niehart v. Universal Jt. Auto Parts, Znc., 141 Idaho 801,803, 
118 P.3d 133, 135 (2005) 
Upon determining that Claimant was not an independent contractor, the Referee 
should have then turned to the issue of who was Claimant's employer, instead of going to 
volunteer status, which was not an issue at hearing. 
The Commission, by bringing up the new issue of whether or not Claimant was a 
volunteer when he was injured, opened the door to the proper application of the rule of 
law to the facts of this case as they relate to implied employment - including proper 
application of the emergency doctrine. If it is error to bring up the emergency doctrine as 
a new issue at this time, as Defendants argue, it was first error for the Commission to 
bring up the "volunteer" issue. 
Claimant contends that application of the emergency doctrine is neither a new 
issue nor an attempt to change the underlying facts. It is an application of the law to the 
facts, which legal doctrine the Commission erroneously failed to either consider or apply 
in coming to it's decision, 
With respect to what constitutes an emergency, clearly the weight of authority 
provides that protection of an employer's property can be considered an emergency. As 
argued previously, regarding emergency services, it is worth repeating that Larsen, on 
Workerman's Compensation Law, the leading authority on work comp law, states that: 
"It is well established that a person who is asked for help in an 
emergency which threatens the employer's interest becomes an employee 
under an implied contract of hire. The most familiar example is that of the 
farmer or bystander who is called upon by an employed trucker to help get 
the truck out of the mire in which it is stuck." 1 Larsen, Workmen's 
Compensation Law, §65[3], p. 65-15. 
As previously argued, the undisputed facts of this case go much further toward 
employment than a mere bystander who is asked to help push out a stuck truck. There is 
no question that the stuck garage door in this case stopped business, denying ingress and 
egress into and out of the storage facility - essentially shutting down the business for as 
long as the door was stuck. According to Chad Rose, Frontier's Genera1 Manager at the 
time, it was important to the business that day to get the door open because they had a 
shipment going out, ready to be loaded onto a truck. Tr. p. 150. Chad Rose testified that 
one of the reasons he allowed Claimant to work on the door and try to un-jam it was 
"because maybe he [Claimant] knew something that you [Chad Rose] or Scott didn't 
know." Tr. p. 152. Clearly the employer's interest was threatened by the stuck door. 
With respect to Defendants' demand for attorney's fees, Defendants' are also in 
error. I.A.R. 41 addresses attomey's fees on appeal and there is no authority for the 
award of attorney's fees against a worker's compensation claimant who unsuccessfully 
appeals to the Supreme Court of Idaho. Swanson v. Kraj?, Inc., 116 Idaho 3 15,775 P.2d 
629 (1989) 
CONCLUSION 
At the time of this accident, Claimant respecttklly contends that the undisputed 
facts show he was either a "lumper" or "day laborer" and was neither an independent 
contractor nor a volunteer. 
Defendant's arguments that Claimant should be precluded from arguing the "new 
issue" of the emergency doctrine is a double-edged sword that cuts both ways. Based on 
their arguments, it was first error for the Commission to consider the new issue of 
whether or not Claimant was a "volunteer," since that issue was not included in the issues 
to be addressed at the hearing. 
Defendant's arguments that they are entitled to attorney's fees are also without 
foundation in either fact or law. 
Claimant respectllly asks the Court for relief, and a finding that the Claimant 
was an employee when he was injured on August 9, 2006, and is entitled to both medical 
and income benefits. 
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